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1. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of electronic marketplaces, scale limitations as encountered in the
brick-and-mortar world no longer apply: the supply side of the market is no longer
restricted by geographical considerations or lack of physical (shelf) space. At the
same time, novel problems are encountered, like how consumers can ¯nd their way
in a large marketplace where very many suppliers o®er their products.
To this end, a mechanism provided by a central party is desired to propose
relevant shops and products to a consumer in e.g. a virtual shopping mall.
A central ¯ltering scheme implemented by a trusted third party is a feasible
solution for several di®erent business areas. It uses knowledge of both the user
and of the shops, as well as knowledge on the product domain to centrally
determine the resulting matches and present them to the user. This approach
is used in recommender systems like Amazon and eBay [Schafer et al. 1999]
to recommend goods on speci¯c domains such as books and CD's, and in
shopbots or pricebots [Greenwald and Kephart 1999], as for instance Bargain-
Finder [Krulwich 1996]. A prototype called MATE [Owen et al. 1999] also
takes shops into account: merchant agents receive the pro¯le of the consumer,
and each suggests one or more products. A personal consumer agent ¯lters
the appropriate products and ranks the remaining products according to the
consumer's preferences. Also, in this approach, signi¯cant knowledge on a product
domain should be incorporated in the personal consumer agent, being a task
of a central party to provide. Keyword pro¯ling is also a popular method for
ranking online sites in search engines. This amounts to contracts for charg-
ing monetary amounts for increased visibility, given speci¯c keyword entries, e.g.
[http://www.google.com ; http://www.overture.com ; http://www.worldmall.com ].
These technologies currently have a static and limited nature.
A central or personal ¯ltering system works well in the case of suitable and well-
demarcated domains, as for instance for a book and music store. However, for
a large heterogeneous marketplace with many participating shops and consumers,
several complexity di±culties arise. This is due to the amount of relevant infor-
mation that has to be tracked and processed by the ¯ltering mechanism in the
form of relevant up-to-date knowledge of e.g.: the consumer's interest in di®erent
product domains and shop categories; the shops' products, ways of doing business,
and business interest; and ontologies and domain knowledge for various product
categories. Also, the weighting of multiple issues like service, quality, price, and
product diversity (add-ons and customization of products) can be important.
Besides the computational complexity problems for information processing, this
requires the transfer of business information of shops towards the central system
as a trusted third party. Such a practice encounters many objections in the daily
business practice, even if only product catalogues are concerned [Vermeer 2001;
Moukas et al. 1998]. In addition, a central mechanism still needs to make decisions
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about what to display in which order to a consumer, in a way that is reasonable to
all parties: all the suppliers and consumers. As is commonly agreed on in economics,
a fair and general weighing of interests (utilities) of di®erent market parties is not
possible, and concepts like Pareto-e±ciency are used instead.
Thus, central ¯ltering mechanisms may su®er from increasing (computational)
complexity as well as serious objections and obstructions from commercial parties
in various sorts of business areas.
In this paper, we present a framework for a distributed Competitive Attention-
space System, CASy, to allocate the scarce resource that is consumer attention
via the techniques of dynamic market-based control [Clearwater 1995; Cheng and
Wellman 1998; Gibney et al. 1999] and adaptive software agents [Weiss 1999;
Guttman et al. 1998; Kephart et al. 2000]. In the example of an electronic
shopping mall, CASy recommends shops to a consumer: the task of matching a
consumer to a set of suitable shops is delegated to the individual shops, each of
which evaluates the information that is available about the consumer and his or
her interests (the consumer's interests and other information which the consumer
is willing to provide; e.g. keywords, product queries, and available parts of a
pro¯le). Based on this information and on their domain knowledge, shops can make
a monetary bid in an auction where a limited amount of consumer attention space,
or banners, for the particular consumer is sold. To facilitate CASy, the system is
designed as a multi-agent system where each shop is represented by a software agent
that executes the task of bidding for the attention of each individual consumer. The
use of learning software agents allows shops to rapidly adapt their bidding strategy
such that they only bid for consumers that are likely to be interested in their
o®erings. Furthermore, e±cient bidding for each customer is only feasible when
automated: hence the use of software agents. These agents allow a shop to process
a large number of small transactions, and enable them to make a deliberated bid
for every customer entering the shopping mall.
In CASy, shops react to consumer behavior and to behaviors of other shops, yield-
ing various interdependencies in the commercial e®ects related to being displayed
together with competitors (Section 2.7). For various basic and simple models for
on-line consumers, shops, and pro¯les, we demonstrate the feasibility of our system,
i.e., that proper matchings of consumers with shops are achieved, and that shops
can learn their niche in the market, even in the case of such interdependencies.
Especially, to validate the economical concept of the market mechanism underly-
ing CASy, we develop an evolutionary agent system for bidding supplier agents.
In this approach, the agent system is investigated like an economic market, as in
agent-based computational economics (ACE). [Tesfatsion 2001; Vriend 1995; van
Bragt et al. 2001; Gerding et al. 2000; van Bragt and La Poutr¶ e 2001; Kirman
and Vriend 2001]. To the best of our knowledge this is a novel approach within the
¯eld of market-based programming. Furthermore, we also develop adaptive soft-
ware agents that learn bidding-strategies, based on neural networks and strategy
exploration heuristics. Finally, we re°ect on the merits of the system, and assess
the advantages and issues that need further attention, from both the technological
and the economical point of view.
We note that the mechanism we describe is not limited to the example of the
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electronic shopping mall, but can easily be extended to other domains where (pre)
selection of possibilities has to be guided, like banners on more general websites,
attention spaces on mobile devices, or other types of marketplaces.
We believe that the system as presented is the natural evolution of auction-based
allocation systems like those currently employed by internet companies like Google
(for sponsored keywords, [http://www.google.com ]) and Overture (for banner tar-
geting, [http://www.overture.com ]). Whereas these pre-cursor systems rely on the
human factor to set essentially static prices for particular goods, the use of software
agents in our system in principle allows a market-party to assess the value of each
individual prospect, if desired at a very detailed level, as well as take into account
real-time business-related domain knowledge and strategies. The implementation
of adaptivity into the software agents allows the \market" for consumer attention
to function more e±ciently, where the targeting of potential prospects can be more
precise, and changing buyer behavior can be tracked and followed. As such, agent-
assisted recommendation in competitive markets represents the next logical step
for current auction-based allocation systems.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the design of CASy is presented.
The simulation model is given in Section 3, whereas Section 4 contains the results.
Section 5 concerns the design of software agents using neural networks. Section 6
re°ects on practical implementation issues such as privacy and the communication
overhead of the mechanism. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. THE DESIGN OF CASY
In this section, we present the framework of CASy (Competitive Attention-space
System) for matching consumers with relevant suppliers in the case of an electronic
shopping mall.
2.1 The General Design
We describe the process of the mechanisms in CASy. When a consumer enters a
shopping mall, he1 expresses his interest for certain products and selects the busi-
ness sector of his interest. The information about his interest, possibly augmented
by additional knowledge, is passed on to potential suppliers in the sector. The
suppliers subsequently compete against each other in an auction by placing bids to
\purchase" one of a limited number of entries of attention space for this speci¯c
consumer. Finally, the consumer is shown the list of winning suppliers, using for
instance banner advertisements. An example is depicted in ¯gure 1.
2.2 Software Agents
Software agents are used to facilitate the ¯ne grain of interaction, bidding, and
selection in CASy. A software agent [Nwana and Ndumu 1999; Weiss 1999] is a
program with an owner, whom it represents. The software agent can autonomously
perform tasks on behalf of its owner in order to satisfy its goals. To this end, it
also has the ability to interact with other agents or external sources.
For our mechanism, we have software agents for the suppliers and for the enabling
intermediary: the central manager.
1\he" stands for \he or she."
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Fig. 1. Advertisements are shown in the form of banners. The banner list is tailored towards a
consumer's characteristics.
Fig. 2. Components of the shopping mall and their interactions.
The goal of an agent representing a supplier is to e®ectively purchase attention
space. The agent will do this by bidding on attention spaces that are to be displayed
to consumers it deems interesting, thus maximizing the supplier's pro¯ts. The
agent can learn this targeting by for instance using the push-back information
from individual customers, e.g. the knowledge whether or not its advertisement
was selected by the customer (click-through), subsequent buying actions, or, to be
provided by the central manager, (selected) click-stream information (e.g. time
spent on pages, mouse actions). Additionally, the agent can use supplier-speci¯c
knowledge and (adaptive) rules for accurate targeting.
A central manager agent (CMA) facilitates these bidding and information dis-
semination processes by providing the auctions and additional customer pro¯ling
services to the suppliers.
The model of the electronic shopping mall is depicted in ¯gure 2, showing both
the software agents and the actual economic players in the shopping mall: the con-
sumers and the suppliers. Note that although the consumer directly communicates
with the mall manager agent (CMA), the assistance of a personal software agent
for the consumer is conceivable.
Instead of addressing to the case of \shops" only, we henceforth mainly use the
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more general term \supplier" to refer to the suppliers of goods or services. The
participants within the shopping mall and their roles are discussed in more detail
in the sections that follow.
2.3 Consumers
In the model of ¯gure 2, the consumer directly communicates its interest and pref-
erences to the CMA, e.g. via a web page. Preferences include the product that
is being searched after and various values for the attributes of the product. The
CMA can also consider information on a consumer's pro¯le. The consumer pro¯le
consists of more generic information on the consumer. This could include regular
personal information like general interests, previous acquisitions, as well as age or
zip code; but also general sales-related information like style or the interest in issues
as price, quality, and service. The consumer can either be queried directly for this
information, or the CMA can derive the information from previous interactions.
The consumer can restrict or disable the dissemination of his pro¯le information.
E.g., distribution of such information can be limited to for speci¯c or anonymized
parts, or to general sales-related information that is derived from the private pro¯le.
2.4 Central Manager
The Central Manager Agent (CMA) acts as an intermediary between consumers and
supplier agents. The task of the CMA is to enable the selection of a set of suppliers
for each arriving consumer. The CMA furthermore provides information from the
consumer to the supplier agents. Given privacy concerns, the consumer pro¯le will
not automatically be communicated in full to the suppliers, as e.g. described in
Subsection 2.3. Information on the consumers could be stored within the CMA
for revisiting consumers, leaving open consumers who wish to remain anonymous.
The CMA applies the auction: it collects the bids of the supplier agents, selects the
winners, charges the selected suppliers, and enables their display. In Subsection 2.6,
we address the auctions in more detail.
2.5 Suppliers
Each supplier \owns" an agent that acts on the supplier's behalf. These agents are
equipped with knowledge and a strategy on behalf of the supplier. Such knowledge
can contain amongst others relevant business information on the supplier that is
needed for the matching process. This information should determine the supplier's
conception of its \niche" in the market, and hence the type of preferred consumer.
Typical business information could be the products carried and the intended au-
dience. Furthermore, the goals and limitations of the supplier can be taken into
account, such as the current quantity of a certain product in stock or the service
level.
The main task of a supplier agent is to bid on arriving consumers. To this
end, it has to evaluate (information about) consumers. Namely, the valuation of a
consumer by a supplier agent is closely linked to its bidding strategy: the bid should
not outweigh the expected pro¯t (if the supplier is to break even) or percentage
thereof. This task can be complicated: the variety of consumers can be great, and
the competitive environment can change rapidly. Also, the supplier's conception of
the targeted audience may deviate from its actual audience.
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2.6 Auctions
The CMA executes the auction protocol, the payment procedure, and the supplier
selection mechanism.
Auction protocol. The actual choice of the auction protocol can depend on
many factors. In this paper, we focus on the single-bid sealed auction, being a
communication-e±cient auction. With this procedure, each supplier submits a sin-
gle sealed bid for a particular consumer. The CMA allocates the available positions
to the highest bidders, where the ¯rst position is allocated to the highest bidder,
the second position to the second highest bidder, and so on. In some environments
the ranking is not important, whereas in other cases the pro¯ts for the supplier
depend on the position obtained. For this reason, the choice payment of payment
scheme matters, and is discussed below. Note that, since the CMA executes the
auction for each arriving consumer, suppliers losing an auction could increase their
bid in the next auction for a similar consumer.
Payment procedure. A payment procedure speci¯es what should be charged and
when. Several di®erent payment schemes are possible for various auction proce-
dures. In the Vickrey auction, the winner pays the price of the second-highest bid.
This is a prominent and widely-used auction type, which has been shown to be ef-
¯cient for independent valuations of the item [Vickrey 1961; Dasgupta and Maskin
2000; Varian 1995]. The auction is also robust, since revealing ones true preferences
is the dominant strategy in case of independent valuations.
In this paper, we focus on an extension of the Vickrey auction where winners
pay the (N+1) price, where N is the number of items (here banners). This is
an instance of the generalized Vickrey auction [Varian 1995], which has the same
auction characteristics as above.
Note that in such a setup, the same price is charged to the winners of a banner
placement. The auction is only theoretically guaranteed to work well if the sold
goods (the attention spaces) are assumed to be identical, an assumption that is
dependent on the way a customer chooses from a list of alternative o®erings. In
the simulations, we investigate models of customer behavior where this assumption
is valid, as well as a model where it does not hold. In the latter case, we also
investigate another payment scheme, the so-called next-price auction. Here, each
winner pays the price of the next-highest bidder. Such more complicated auctions
are notoriously hard to theoretically demonstrate optimal behavior for, and we use
the ACE methods (as discussed later) to show that in the simulations this auction
does work e±ciently in the case where the valuation of an attention space depends
on the position it has on the list and when the highest position is the most valuable
(and the second-highest position is the next most valuable etc..).
2.7 E®ectiveness and Feasibility
Although the typical business information for the supplier agent can contain many
variables that relate to those in a consumer pro¯le, these cannot be matched di-
rectly. Rather, the supplier must ¯nd and improve its actual niche in the market,
especially in the ¯ne-grained advertisement mechanism CASy. Similar observations
hold even more for the valuation of a consumer.
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The need for accurate valuation and targeting is especially pronounced when
consumers are signi¯cantly contested by competing suppliers. We illustrate this
by the case of a very expensive department store: consumers arriving in a fancy
car are a priori as likely to buy at the store as consumers arriving in a middle-
class car. However, when a cheaper department store exists across the street, this
competition changes the behavior of the latter consumers much more than of the
former. Similarly, in CASy the valuation of an advertisement space depends on the
selection of and competition between suppliers.
An N+1 auction mechanism is theoretically e±cient in case of fully rational
agents and independent valuation of the items. However, if consumer purchases are
like consumer models 2 and 3 (see also Section 3.5), the valuation of advertisement
space also depends on the selection and competition between various suppliers. It
is then unclear whether an e±cient allocation of the attention space will emerge,
i.e., a correct match between consumers and suppliers with the largest appearing
interests for being displayed together.
In the following, we will show via evolutionary simulation as in the ¯eld of agent-
based computational economics (ACE, [Tesfatsion 2001]) and by implementations
of software agents, that the market mechanism is indeed e®ective and results in an
e±cient allocation. Furthermore, supplier agents learn to properly evaluate their
environment and thereby locate their niche in the market.
3. EVOLUTIONARY SIMULATION MODEL OF CASY
In this section, we model the electronic shopping mall for an evolutionary simulation
as in ACE, based on Section 2. The goal of the simulation is to assess the feasibility
of the market mechanism of CASy (see Section 2.7). To this end, we will make some
additional assumptions and simpli¯cations, which enables us to study, measure, and
visualize the emerging behavior of CASy (results are given in Section 4).
3.1 Central Manager Agent
The CMA has 3 banner advertisements to dispatch (see also ¯gure 1), and executes
the auction as described before.
3.2 Consumer Models
We abstract away from any interpretation of the pro¯les. Pro¯les are represented
by a vector of real values. In the simulations, the consumers are classi¯ed by a one
or two dimensional vector with entries in a [0:::1] range. The pro¯le can re°ect a
consumer's interests such as price segment, taste, or quality, or any combination of
characteristics projected on 1 or 2 dimensions. We thus model a class of consumers
for some given category of products. In the simulation of CASy, several consumers
with di®erent pro¯les arrive and are contested by the suppliers in CASy.
3.3 Supplier Models
We will denote by gross pro¯t the pro¯t that a supplier earns on a product, before
the cost of advertisement is taken into account (but after accounting for all other
costs), and by net pro¯t the pro¯t after deduction of all costs, including advertise-
ment cost.
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The goal of a supplier is to maximize net pro¯ts, and therefore a supplier tries
to sell as many items as possible at the lowest possible advertising costs. The net
pro¯t of a supplier is also referred to as the supplier's payo®. The suppliers in the
simulation have no initial knowledge of their own actual niche or payo® function in
the market (see Section 2.7).
A bidding strategy speci¯es the monetary bid for each possible consumer pro¯le.
Given the feedback in the form of actual payo® for visiting consumers, a supplier
agent adapts its bidding strategy and thereby indirectly learns the consumer be-
havior and its competitive environment determined by other supplier agents. Note
that these two factors are interrelated (see also Subsection 3.5).
Evolutionary Simulation. We use evolutionary simulation like in the ¯eld of
agent-based computational economics (ACE) [Tesfatsion 2001; Vriend 1995; Gerd-
ing et al. 2000; van Bragt et al. 2001; van Bragt and La Poutr¶ e 2001; Alkemade
et al. 2003], where suppliers that interact and compete in a market are evolved, in
order to investigate their emerging behavior and the equilibrium situation. Recall
that a supplier's goal is to maximize payo®.
We proceed as follows. Each supplier agent is replaced by a population of strate-
gies. These strategies are evaluated and evolved according to the amount of pro¯t
they earn in single CASy simulation. In such a CASy simulation, a number of
consumers arrive, supplier strategies bid for each of these, and the winners get the
expected payo®s as described in Subsections 3.4 and 3.5. The strategies that are
evolved after repeating this process many times, show the emerging behavior of
the suppliers. Hence, the process of evolution ¯nds e®ective strategies for a CASy
simulation.
An evolutionary algorithm (EA) is used to adapt the strategies of the supplier
agents. EAs are strongly inspired by the genetic evolution theory in biology, as
developed by Darwin. EAs typically work as follows. First, for each supplier a
population of randomly initialized strategies is generated. The populations are
subsequently changed and improved in a number of iterations (\generations") by
means of selection and mutation. Selection chooses the better strategies (with
higher accumulated payo®) which survive in the next generation. This corresponds
to the concept of \survival of the ¯ttest" in nature. The selected strategies are
subsequently changed slightly in a random way (\mutation"), to enable diversity
in the population.
Our implementation is based on \evolution strategies" (ES), a branch of evolu-
tionary algorithms that traditionally focuses on real-coded problems [BÄ ack 1996].2
We use standard parameter settings for EAs (see Appendix A).
3.4 Buying Behavior Model for One Consumer and one Supplier
We model the purchasing behavior of a single consumer for one isolated supplier.
For each supplier i, the expected gross monopolistic pro¯ts Eh¼i(c)i is its average
gross pro¯ts for a possible purchase following the observation of a consumer of its
2The widely-used genetic algorithms (GAs) are more tailored toward binary-coded search spaces
[Holland 1975; Mitchell 1996; Goldberg 1989].
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advertisement, while no other supplier is shown. We take
Eh¼i(c)i = ¹iPi(c);
where Pi(c) denotes the monopolistic purchase probability for consumer pro¯le c
and ¹i is a constant value related to the supplier's average pro¯t when a purchase
is made. Note that both ¹i and Pi(c) are taken as an externally imposed model for
interaction and are initially not known or available to the supplier.
In the simulation each supplier is given a center of attraction ai, where Pi(c) is
maximized. We used two types of purchase probability functions Pi in the experi-
ments: (1) linear functions, where the Pi is proportional to the Euclidean distance
d(c;ai) in the following way:
Pi(c) = 1 ¡ ±d(c;ai);
and (2) Gaussian functions with the highest point corresponding to the center of
attraction. The width of the Gaussian curve is then set by parameter ¾i. For
simplicity the maximal monopolistic purchase probability is set constant to 1. This
value can be chosen lower, but is chosen for maximal discrimination between various
advanced behavior models (see Subsection 3.5).
3.5 Buying Behavior Model for Several Displayed Suppliers
As the consumer is presented with a selection of winning "Consumer Attention
Spaces", we assume that with some probability p he or she will buy a product. In
e®ect, this stochastic behavior can be modeled as meaning that a single presentation
of banners results in an amount p of products being sold: how much and at which
recommended supplier (the buying behavior) is formalized in the Customer Buying
Behavior Models. Here, we present several Customer Buying Behavior Models,
as the behavior of consumers shopping for a speci¯c product may be di®erent for
di®erent product areas or di®erent consumer populations.
We modeled three classes of consumer behavior:
(1) Independent visits with several purchases. In this model (see ¯gure 3), the con-
sumer visits all displayed suppliers, and can buy products at several suppliers
(e.g. CDs).
(2) Independent visits with one expected purchase. In this model (see ¯gure 4), a
consumer visits all displayed suppliers and then buys on average one product
in total (e.g. a computer).
(3) Search-till-found behavior. In this model (see ¯gure 5), the consumer visits the
suppliers in sequential order from top to bottom, until he ¯nds a supplier with
the proper product, which he buys (e.g. a raisin bread).
The consumer behavior in these models is stochastic: whether a product is pur-
chased by consumer c at a certain supplier j depends on a probability value Qj(c).
The monopolistic purchase probabilities Pi(c) are the basic parameters, determin-
ing these probability values Qj(c) as shown in ¯gures 3 to 5. The expected gross
pro¯ts Eh½j(c)i for supplier j is then given by
Eh½j(c)i = ¹jQj(c):
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Fig. 3. Consumer model of independent visits with several purchases, where Pi = Pi(c).
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Fig. 4. Consumer model of independent visits with up to one purchase, where Pi = Pi(c).
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Fig. 5. Consumer model with search-till-found behavior, where Pi = Pi(c).
Notice that in the models of ¯gure 4 and 5, the probability that an item is sold at
one supplier depends on the monopolistic purchase probabilities of its competitors
within the list. Importantly, for the third model, the actual position of a supplier
on the list in°uences the expected average proceeds, meaning that the individual
banners are no longer identical. We will address this issue, and a solution, in detail
in Section 4.5.
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Parameter Value
Number of suppliers 8
Number of banner spaces (N) 3
Maximum bid value 1.5
Consumer behavior model 1 / 2 / 3
Expected gross monopolistic pro¯t (Eh¼i) set1 / set2/ set3
Pro¯le dimensionality 1 or 2
Number of de¯ning points 8 (1 dimension), 16 (2 dimensions)
Number of consumers 50 (1 dimension), 100 (2 dimensions)
Table I. Default settings of the simulations.
Eh¼i function name Type ¹i ± ¾
Set1 Linear 1.0 2.0 -
Set2 Gaussian 1.0 - 0.2
Set3 Linear variable variable -
Table II. Consumer purchase functions and their general settings.
3.6 Measure for Proper Selection of Suppliers in an Auction
The selection procedure in an auction should ultimately lead to an appropriate
selection of suppliers for consumers. We start from the economic point of view of
optimizing the revenue of the collection of shops in the shopping mall as a whole.
Consider the n suppliers with the largest expected payo®s for a given consumer.
We measure the proportion of properly selected n suppliers as the fraction of these
n suppliers that are present in the actual list of 3 displays shown to the consumer.
From the consumer point of view, we can interpret the expenditures of a consumer
at a supplier as a measure for his interest in the supplier. In case that the ratio
between expenditures and payo® within a certain business sector is similar for the
suppliers in that sector, the above measure is related to both the consumer interests
as well as the supplier interests.
4. RESULTS
We performed a number of experiments in the e-shopping-mall simulation outlined
in Section 3. The results are given and discussed in the following subsections.
4.1 Simulation Settings
Table I shows the parameters and their values which are varied for di®erent simu-
lation runs. The parameters refer to Section 3. Two of the parameters are further
explained below.
|Expected gross monopolistic pro¯t functions (Eh¼i). The Eh¼i-functions are ex-
plained in Section 3.4. The applied settings are speci¯ed in table II. Figure 6
shows the functions \set2" for 8 di®erent suppliers and a one-dimensional con-
sumer pro¯le. The functions de¯ned in \set3" have di®erent ¹i and ± combi-
nations for each supplier; ¹i varies between 0:5 and 1:0, and ± between 1:0 and
2:0.
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.Market-based Recommendation: Agents that Compete for Consumer Attention. ¢ 13
Fig. 6. Expected gross monopolistic pro¯ts at the di®erent stores for \set2" function settings.
|Number of de¯ning points. A supplier has to obtain a bidding function on the
space of consumer pro¯les. The function that is learned is an interpolation func-
tion, based on a number of de¯ning points. For the one-dimensional case, this
results in a piecewise linear function; for the two-dimensional case, we obtain the
function values by triangularisation of the pro¯le surface.
4.2 Single Advertisement Model
In this subsection, we illustrate the use and evolution of the bidding function for
a supplier for a very simple setting, where the optimal bidding strategy is known
from auction theory.
The setting contains a single store competing against a random opponent for
the case of one banner. The random player bids any random value between 0 and
1:5. Since a Vickrey (second-price) auction is used, it is a well-known dominant
strategy for the supplier to bid its true valuation (i.e. the expected gross pro¯t)
[Vickrey 1961]; any lower bid risks a missed pro¯t-opportunity, whereas a higher
bid might result in direct loss. The dominant strategy maximizes the supplier's
net pro¯t, regardless of the opponent's behavior. Thus, the store should learn the
pro¯t function as the bidding function. The results for experiments on this setting
show that this happens indeed. Typical, good results are shown in ¯gure 7, where
Eh¼i is a Gaussian (recall that piecewise linear functions are used).
4.3 Consumer Model 1: Independent Visits with Several Purchases
This consumer model assumes that expected purchases at each supplier can be
modeled by the same function as in the single banner case (see Subsection 3.5).
The results are shown in ¯gure 8. Matching accuracy is measured in several
ways. We display the proportion of properly selected n suppliers for 3 banners and
n = 3;2;1 (see Subsection 3.6). The reason for including n = 2;1 as well is that
the evolutionary system has some degree of stochasticity, and thus small errors
occurring frequently can have larger in°uence on individual outcomes (although
relatively little impact on the payo® obtained). Results using these two measures
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Fig. 7. Example of a bidding strategy as employed by the supplier after co-evolution no longer
increased the pro¯ts obtained. Results are shown for a single supplier competing against random
supplier. Also shown is the dominant bidding strategy.
Consumer model Eh¼i n = 3 n = 2 n = 1
Regular auction settings
1 set1 0:95 § 0:01 0:99 § 0:00 0:99 § 0:00
set2 0:96 § 0:00 0:99 § 0:00 1:00 § 0:00
set3 0:92 § 0:01 0:98 § 0:00 0:99 § 0:00
2 set1 0:94 § 0:01 0:99 § 0:00 0:99 § 0:00
set2 0:95 § 0:00 0:99 § 0:00 1:00 § 0:00
set3 0:90 § 0:01 0:97 § 0:01 0:99 § 0:00
3 set1 0:73 § 0:03 0:76 § 0:07 0:79 § 0:09
set2 0:83 § 0:05 0:89 § 0:06 0:92 § 0:05
set3 0:75 § 0:02 0:89 § 0:02 0:97 § 0:01
Next-price auction
3 set1 0:79 § 0:03 0:92 § 0:03 0:97 § 0:02
set2 0:75 § 0:03 0:92 § 0:02 0:98 § 0:01
set3 0:83 § 0:02 0:95 § 0:02 0:99 § 0:00
Table III. Matching results for consumer models 1 through 3. Results denote proportions of
properly selected n suppliers for 3 banners and n = 3;2;1. Averages over 10 runs of the simulation
are shown with the standard deviations.
show an almost perfect match. The results after 500 generations of the EA are
summarized in table III.
4.4 Consumer Model 2: One Expected Purchase
It is more di±cult to get a stable system in this situation, since the expected amount
purchased at a supplier (and therefore the valuation of a banner space) depends on
which other stores are selected as well. Nevertheless, the simulation does stabilize,
and the results are comparable to the previous consumer model. See table III.
4.5 Consumer Model 3: Search-Till-Found
In this model, it is not only important for the stores to be in the list, but also to take
into account the position on the list (and the other stores above him). Table III
shows that it is indeed more di±cult for the stores to ¯nd a good matching, in
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Fig. 8. Matching results for consumers with independent purchases and Eh¼i is set to \set2".
particular when using \set1". This occurs since all relevant suppliers prefer the
very top advertisement space and are willing to bid above their valuation (because
of the N + 1-price auction their payment remains relatively low). As a result, the
bids reach their limit value (even when this is set to 2.5).
Therefore, we have applied another auction payment procedure as well: each
of the winning stores pays the price o®ered by the next following highest bidder,
the so-called next-price auction. This procedure appears to improve the matching,
giving comparable results to other consumer models (see table III). Note that a
store who obtains the ¯rst banner position now pays more than the other stores.
This is also reasonable, since the ¯rst position is actually more valuable.
We want to remark that we have chosen the maximal purchase probability to 1
(see Subsection 3.4) to have maximum di®erence between this consumer model and
the previous ones. When this value is lower, results will become more comparable
to the other models also for the regular auction setting.
4.6 Two-Dimensional Pro¯le
We now consider the two-dimensional case, where each consumer pro¯le corresponds
to a position within a square. The types of pro¯t functions are similar to the
previous case, extended for two dimensions. An example is shown in ¯gure 9.
The matching results are comparable, but slightly less accurate than for one
dimension, see table IV. These can be explained through the more di±cult learning
problem (more de¯ning points are needed for the search function), and thus the
settings of the evolutionary algorithms could be further optimized for more accurate
learning results in this case (which is beyond the scope of the current paper).
Specialization. Interestingly, the suppliers indeed ¯nd a niche in the market in
case of competition. This becomes clear in ¯gure 10, which shows the intersection
of a supplier's bidding strategy for two di®erent consumer models, viz. 1 and
2. For consumer model 1, a supplier's payo® is independent of the other suppliers
displayed. In the second consumer model, however, the payo® is shared amongst the
displayed suppliers. In the latter model the payo® thus depends on the competition.
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Consumer model Eh¼i n = 3 n = 2 n = 1
1 set1 0:95 § 0:01 0:99 § 0:00 1:00 § 0:00
set2 0:90 § 0:02 0:97 § 0:01 0:99 § 0:01
set3 0:93 § 0:01 0:98 § 0:00 0:99 § 0:00
2 set1 0:94 § 0:01 0:98 § 0:00 0:99 § 0:00
set2 0:92 § 0:01 0:98 § 0:00 1:00 § 0:00
set3 0:93 § 0:01 0:98 § 0:00 0:99 § 0:00
3 set1 0:85 § 0:01 0:93 § 0:01 0:97 § 0:01
set2 0:75 § 0:02 0:89 § 0:02 0:97 § 0:01
set3 0:82 § 0:02 0:91 § 0:02 0:94 § 0:02
Table IV. Matching results for consumers with two-dimensional pro¯les. See also table III for
comparison.
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Fig. 9. Expected gross monopolistic pro¯ts Eh¼i for \set2" function settings and a 2-dimensional
consumer pro¯le.
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Fig. 10. Contours of the average evolved strategy at level 0.5 of a supplier 1 at generation 500 for
consumer models 1 (left) and 2 (right) using \set2". The points indicate the centers of attraction
of the suppliers' Gaussian curves.
We ¯nd that this gives supplier an incentive to locate niches in the market, and bid
more in places where less competition is present. In ¯gure 10, the depicted supplier
clearly expands its market to the upper right, and reduces its bids in the lower left
region, where competition is relatively greater.
Supplier Payo®. The above results mainly focus on the proportion of proper
selection. We now brie°y discuss the supplier payo®s, i.e. the net pro¯ts (see
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Fig. 11. The average accumulated payo® for each supplier using \set2" and consumer model 2.
Section 3.3). Firstly, we ¯nd that in all experiments suppliers obtain positive ac-
cumulative payo® in the long run. The strategies emerged are thus individually
rational. Secondly, a supplier's payo® depends both on its function settings Eh¼i
and on the amount of competition. The latter is shown in ¯gure 11, which displays
the accumulated payo® of the suppliers for consumer model 2 and \set2". The
more isolated suppliers, in particular suppliers 4, 6, and 7, obtain a larger payo®
than those with much competition (see also ¯gure 10). This is due to the di®erence
in advertisement costs. Note that this is in accordance with economics theory: in
case of large competition, the net pro¯t of competing suppliers is close to zero.
4.7 Conclusion
The experiments show that a proper selection of suppliers emerges with very good
to perfect matches. In case consumer model 3 is applicable, a next-price auction
mechanism further improves the results. Furthermore, we ¯nd that all experiments
show positive supplier payo®s. Finally, we observe that shops ¯nd their customers
and their niche in the market via CASy.
5. SOFTWARE AGENTS WITH NEURAL NETWORKS FOR ONLINE AUCTION
LEARNING
5.1 Online-learning with Software Agents
In this section, we brie°y describe the development of adaptive software agents
that can perform online learning from a repeated general Vickrey auction, and we
show some of the results we obtained with this adaptive approach based on neural
networks.
First we remark that for online-learning, we deal with a variant of reinforcement
learning, e.g. [Sutton and Barto 1998]. In the N + 1-price sealed-bid auction,
learning signals constitute of the (average) payo® generated by a winning bid for
a particular consumer pro¯le, as well as the information that a losing bid is below
the winning bid, or \going-price", in the market. Note that receiving payo® is in
principle a stochastic process. Since payo® is normalized in the simulation, this
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stochastic nature can be expressed by taking the instant payo® as a discrete value
2 f0;1g, which averages to the payo® we de¯ned in Section 3.
For a given consumer pro¯le, our agent generates two estimates: the expected
payo® (the \value") and the expected going-price; in addition, uncertainties asso-
ciated with these expectations are calculated. These values are then combined into
a resulting bid according to a heuristic algorithm that balances the exploitation
of accumulated information versus exploration aimed at reducing uncertainty in
the estimates. When exploiting, the agent bids the estimated payo®, as bidding
the actual payo® is a dominant strategy in the N + 1-price auctions considered in
Section 5.2.
The algorithm was implemented with two ensembles (sets) of neural networks
(multi-layer perceptrons, although alternative architectures could also be used, e.g.
[Bohte et al. 2002]) in each software agent, where each ensemble of networks acts
as a function-approximator that learns respectively the expected payo® and the
going-price, both as a function of the consumer pro¯le. By using ensembles of
neural networks, we can use existing techniques for estimating the uncertainty in
the respective function-approximations by the neural network ensembles [Heskes
1997]. The uncertainty in the estimates constitutes an important ingredient in our
heuristic for learning from losing bids.
5.2 Results with Adaptive Neural Software Agents
For the consumer models 1 and 2 (Section 3.5), it is easy to see that bidding the ac-
tual payo® by a shop is a dominant strategy. Within the shopping-mall simulation
outlined in Section 3 and these consumer models, we performed a number of exper-
iments to test whether the shop-agents endowed with neural networks are capable
of learning the correct valuations from the second-price auctioning of consumer-
pro¯les.
For all examples tested, we found that the agents accurately learned the payo®
pro¯les, both for one and for three banners, a stochastic payo® or averaged payo®,
and various numbers of competitors. We observed that the exploration-expenditure
stabilized to a small fraction of the revenues after the initial learning phase of
typically 50 consumers. After this time, all shops become (accumulated) pro¯table
and generate accurately targeted bids. The time needed for learning was very short:
on average it took less than 50 consumers to visit the mall for the shops to learn
which consumers are pro¯table; this held for all simulations we performed, with up
to 8 competing shops. An example of online learning for bidding on three available
banners is shown in ¯gures 12, 13. The results shown are for the case where for
every winning bid the associated average payo® was returned (the case of stochastic
payo® took somewhat longer to converge).
6. EVALUATION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
6.1 Re°ections
In the previous sections, we have presented CASy and showed its feasibility.
We can identify a number of commercial and technological advantages of CASy.
In CASy, proper matching does not have to be performed or enabled by a third
party. This signi¯cantly reduces the combinatorial complexity as compared to cen-
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.Market-based Recommendation: Agents that Compete for Consumer Attention. ¢ 19
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
value estimates of ANN ensembles after 200 customers
customer profile
v
a
l
u
e
value profiles
ANN estimate
Fig. 12. The consumer valuation as learned by the shop-agents (solid lines) after bidding
for 200 consumer pro¯les, and the actual market valuation (dotted lines), for consumer-
behavior model 2, as in Section 3.5.
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Fig. 13. Shop-selection resulting from the submitted bids. Plotted is the proportion of
properly selected n suppliers (Section 3.6) for the 200 sequential consumers for three
banners and n = 1;n = 2 and n = 3. Regularly one out of three matching shops is
\ousted", but given the low payo® for third place in our experiments (third consumer-
valuation or dotted line in ¯g. 12), the third-highest bid is easily exceeded by even minimal
explorations by other shops.
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trally processing all product ontologies and information about consumers and shops.
Furthermore, shops have substantial autonomy and can thus incorporate local do-
main knowledge and momentary business considerations in their bidding strategies
and thus in the ultimate matching process. Especially, they do not have to reveal
sensitive business information to a third party, and can take more sales aspects into
account: not only product pricing, but also service level, quality, product diversity,
or customization of products. The system also enables them to quickly adapt to
market dynamics or their own internal situation (out-of-stock, discount periods,
promotion). Note that the relevance of the shop for the consumer is still expressed
via the monetary bidding procedure. The mechanism is also a form of dynamic
pricing of attention space.
There is much debate about whether or not advances in Information Technology
(IT) will increasingly make intermediaries within markets redundant (disintermedi-
ation) [Gellmann 1996], or whether such advanced IT will help reestablish interme-
diaries because of new value-added services that become possible (reintermediation)
(cf Chircu and Kau®man, 1999 [Chircu and RJ. 1999]. The results in this paper can
be taken either way: on the one hand, we can conceive the basic auction functional-
ity performed by the CMA to be part of the customer agent, replacing the matching
function previously performed by central ¯ltering mechanisms. Alternatively, we
noted that there are many possible value-added services regarding user-pro¯le en-
hancement that could be performed by a central shopping mall intermediary. This
conclusion is in line with recent arguments regarding the e®ects of current agent
technology on the disintermediation/reintermedation debate [Nissen 2000].
The proceeds the electronic shopping mall can derive from the matching mech-
anism (through the auctions) can be used to facilitate additional intermediation
services to both customers and shops (e.g. micropayments, 24x7 intermediation).
O®ering an e®ective matching mechanism adds considerable value to the customer
experience, and can thus be expected to be an important selling point for the elec-
tronic shopping mall, and entice suppliers to participate in the mechanism. It will
be interesting to investigate the exact economic conditions { such as at which price
the suppliers are no longer prepared to follow the customers { for this to be relevant,
but we leave that for future research here.
Some points need attention when further implementing CASy. In CASy, infor-
mation about a consumer is (partially) communicated to suppliers. At the same
time however, the consumer's privacy requirements must be respected. We will
not extensively address this here, but just mention some approaches: having the
consumer decide what information he allows to be communicated, restricting the
types of communicated information in general, or conversion of personal informa-
tion to more sales-related properties. The latter could include restricting the pro¯le
to attributes of the desired product (instead of the customer), like \expensive vs.
cheap", \ultra trendy vs. conservative" etc.... Such attributes could in principle
even be queried from the customer. As argued in [Kobsa 2001], no uniform solution
for privacy demands exist, rather \privacy will have to be dynamically tailored to
each individual user's needs" and requirements.
There remains the issue whether a central entity like the shopping mall would be
willing to convey individual user related pro¯le information. Google for instance
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currently considers its clickstream information a business secret. In the setup we
introduced in the paper however, the proceeds that the intermediary obtains from
the ongoing auctions, and possibly for additional advanced IT services, will be a
strong incentive for the intermediary to consider what parts of the pro¯le informa-
tion are allowed to be disseminated by its clients (here, the suppliers). Note that
when the intermediary charges a (¯xed) price for customer pro¯le information ser-
vices, such information would constitute a sunk cost for each seller, and reduce the
available funds for placing advertisements, resulting in lower bids. Since such cost
will reduce all bids from all agents, the relative ordering of the bids remains intact
and the market-based selection mechanism itself is not a®ected by such additional
cost.
We remark that once individual shops receive customer (related) pro¯les, they
have the tools developed in information intensive personalized marketing research at
their disposal for determining how interested they are in each individual customer:
i.e. interactive marketing, database marketing, micromarketing and one-to-one
marketing [Montgomery and Srinivasan 2002; Montgomery 2001; Blattberg and
Deighton 1991; Haeckel 1998; Peppers et al. 1999]; in [Sha®er and Zhang 2002]
these slightly di®erent approaches are considered in more detail. The information
¯ltering mechanism we describe in this paper is then the gate controlling the °ood
of ¯nely targeted business interests.
Another point concerns the communication between suppliers and shopping mall,
which is increased because of the bidding process and the communication of con-
sumer pro¯les to the suppliers. However, the communication in the mall is linear
in the number of customers, and also in the number of participating shops, and the
size of the consumer pro¯le. The latter is also typically very small, e.g. up to 100
bytes. In a prototype implementation on a single PC, a single market comprising of
100 learning shop-agents was easily able to sustain 100 customers per second, and
still continuously update the internal state of the agents (the learning mechanism)
['t Hoen et al. 2002].
To scale to even larger settings, the market can be divided into a number of
segments, with each market handled by di®erent agents. The pro¯le then only
needs to be transmitted to agents within a particular market segments, reducing
the overall communication. We pursued this approach in a distributed prototype
of the electronic shopping mall (['t Hoen et al. 2002]). In the extended agent
architecture of the prototype di®erent market segments are handled by sub agents
(which can run on di®erent machines). In all, we do not perceive the somewhat
increased communication as a signi¯cant problem, but rather as an issue that can
easily be addressed in the process of framework-engineering if necessary.
6.2 Open Problems and Future Research
We investigated the concept of CASy for several basic models. The results we
describe here show that the market-based approach yields excellent buyer-seller
matching given adaptation of the bids made by the sellers. The ACE simulations
have been carried out to demonstrate feasibility and learnability of the concept,
as these simulations showed e®ective matching for di®erent auction types and con-
sumer behavior models. It is also interesting to investigate how software agents can
be developed for more advanced settings: one such example would be the extension
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of the simulations to a dynamical market, with sellers changing their pro¯les, or
sellers entering and leaving the market. For ACE feasibility and learnability studies,
methods that can deal with such dynamic environments are only just starting to
emerge. As we demonstrated that the steady state version of the problem per-se is
both e®ective and learnable, we would expect that dynamic versions of the problem
would also be learnable, but the e®ectiveness is then rather dependent on the speed
and quality of the machine learning techniques employed by the shop agents as well
as the actually chosen models for the dynamic environment. E.g., for methods such
as neural networks, the introduction of dynamics into the market will mean that
additional complexity in terms of e®ective (commercial) exploration/exploitation
strategies has to be introduced. At this point we leave the investigation of dy-
namization of the system as an interesting problem for future research.
Other points that need to be addressed in future work should be concerned
with taking account of the role of (local) ontologies, of marketing and data-mining
techniques, and of partial consumer information. Furthermore, in this work, we
placed an emphasis on the N+1-price auction with single sealed bids. Other types of
auctions could be further investigated, for example addressing the possible feedback
given on bids of other participants (e.g. multi-round auctions) or to address the
revenue of the central manager.
From the consumer's point of view, we have interpreted the expenditures of a
consumer at a shop as a measure for his interest in the shop. CASy gives priority
to suppliers with the largest expected payo®s for a given consumer. This thus
leads to optimization of the revenue of the collection of shops in the shopping mall
as a whole. In the case that within a certain business sector, the ratio between
expenditures and payo® is similar for the suppliers in the sector, this means that
CASy completely reacts on the interest of an individual consumer. However, across
di®erent sectors, there may be di®erences or anomalies, leaving the extension of
CASy with additional (monetary) correction mechanisms to avoid such anomalies
as an interesting open problem. This is part of our future work.
Finally, our system CASy is complementary to existing recommendation systems.
It is important to know in what way these together could be used as part of a broader
system. Also, which application areas are more suited for the existing recommender
systems, and which for the CASy system.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a competitive distributed system, CASy, for al-
locating consumer attention space (Section 2). By evolutionary simulation as in
agent-based computational economics (ACE), we have shown the conceptual feasi-
bility of the system (Sections 3 and 4). I.e., we modeled the various parts in the
system in a basic and simple way suitable for analysis, visualization, and compar-
ison, and showed that proper matchings emerged while suppliers could learn their
niche in the market. Furthermore, we designed adaptive software agents for suppli-
ers for the above models and showed that these performed successfully (Section 5).
Finally, we re°ected on the advantages, opportunities, and further open problems
concerning the proposed system (Section 6).
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Fig. 14. Iteration loop of the evolutionary algorithm. First, o®spring are created from the
parental population using mutation and recombination operators. The best candidates of
the union of parents and o®spring are then selected to be the parents in the next iteration.
EA Parental population size (¹) 25
Parameters O®spring population size (¸) 25
Selection scheme (¹ + ¸)-ES
Mutation model self-adaptive
Initial standard deviations (¾i(0)) 0.1
Minimum standard deviation (²¾) 0.025
Table V. Default settings of the evolutionary system.
APPENDIX
An evolutionary algorithm (EA) is used to evolve the bidding strategies of the sup-
plier agents. The implementation is based on \evolution strategies"(ES), a branch
of evolutionary computation that traditionally focuses on real-coded problems [BÄ ack
1996].3 Below we ¯rst outline the general functioning of the EA and we then provide
further details.
The di®erent stages within an iteration of the evolutionary algorithm are depicted
in Fig. 14. The system initially starts with a randomly initialized \parental" pop-
ulation for each supplier within the system. Each individual within a population
is de¯ned by its chromosome, which represents the bidding strategy used (further
details are provided below).
In the next stage (see Fig. 14), \o®spring" individuals are created. An o®spring
agent is generated in two steps. First, an individual in the parental population is
(randomly, with replacement) selected. This agent's strategy is then mutated to
create a new o®spring individual (the mutation model is speci¯ed below).
In the ¯nal stage of the iteration (see Fig. 14), the ¯ttest individuals are selected
as the new \parents" for the next iteration (the selection procedure is explained
in detail below). The ¯tness of an individual is determined by the so-called ¯tness
function (details are provided below), and is an indication of the performance of
the individual's bidding strategy.
This ¯nal step completes one iteration (or \generation") of the EA. All relevant
settings of the evolutionary system are listed in Table V.
3The widely-used genetic algorithms (GAs) are more tailored toward binary-coded search spaces
[Holland 1975; Mitchell 1996; Goldberg 1989].
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Selection model. Selection is performed using the (¹ + ¸)-ES selection scheme
[BÄ ack 1996]. In conventional notation, ¹ is the number of parents and ¸ is the
number of generated o®spring (¹=¸=25, see Table V). The ¹ survivors with the
highest ¯tness are selected (deterministically) from the union of parental and o®-
spring agents. The (¹ + ¸)-ES selection scheme is an example of an \overlapping
generations" model, in which successful agents can survive for multiple generations.
In general, EAs use two additional operators: mutation and recombination. These
operators are explained in detail below.
Fitness evaluation. The ¯tness function measures the performance of a bidding
strategy. The actual performance naturally depends on the context, i.e. the pro¯les
of the visiting consumers and the bidding strategies used by the opponents (viz. the
competing shops). In order to obtain an adequate indication of the performance,
the ¯tness measure is based on both aspects. Firstly, the total amount of pro¯ts
made when a number of di®erent virtual customers visit the mall is measured.
The ¯tness of a strategy is then equal to the average pro¯ts obtained in several
trials with di®erent opponent strategies. The ¯tness of the opponent strategies is
determined concurrently.
We now give a more detailed description of the steps used to determine the ¯tness
of the suppliers' bidding strategies.
(1) For each of the suppliers combine the o®spring and parent population into a
single larger population. We now have m populations, one for each supplier.
(2) Reset all previously made pro¯ts.
(3) Select randomly a single strategy from each population. These bidding strate-
gies are used by the suppliers in the competition. If the competitor is set
to random (as in Section 4.2), however, the strategies are evaluated against
random bidding strategies.
(4) Let a number of consumers with di®erent pro¯les visit the shopping mall in a
sequential order. We use a ¯xed set of consumers that are evenly distributed
over the pro¯le space (this reduces stochastic variation in measuring the per-
formance of the strategies).
(5) For each consumer the supplier obtains feedback on the obtained pro¯ts. When
a consumer visits the mall the following steps determine the pro¯ts:
(a) Each supplier bids on the consumer using the selected strategy and given
the consumer's pro¯le. The strategy is basically a function which maps the
consumer pro¯le to a bid. Below, the details on the strategy representation
are described.
(b) The mall manager agent (MMA) selects the winners and determines the
advertising costs, as described in Section 2.6. Only suppliers who bid higher
than zero will participate in the negotiation.
(c) The MMA shows the list of selected suppliers to the consumer, who decides
how much to buy. The purchase amount is determined by the consumer
pro¯le and consumer behavior models described in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
(6) The total pro¯ts (purchases minus advertising costs) for each strategy are then
stored for later reference.
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bid value
consumer profile 0 1
Fig. 15. Piece-wise linear bidding strategy as learned by co-evolution. The bidding strategy
determines the bid value for any consumer pro¯le.
(7) If the pro¯ts of a strategy have been determined a pre-set, ¯xed number of trials
(and the strategy has thus been tested against di®erent opponent strategies),
this strategy is removed from the population.
(8) The process is repeated from step 2 until all the populations are empty.
(9) The ¯tness for each strategy then equals the average pro¯t obtained in each of
the trials.
Bidding strategy. In general terms, a supplier's bidding strategy is a function
which returns a bid value given the consumer pro¯le. Within the set-up of the
simulation the pro¯le has either one or two dimensions. In case of a single dimen-
sion, the strategy is represented using a piece-wise linear function that returns the
bid given a value along the consumer-pro¯le axis. An example of such a bidding
strategy is given in Fig. 15. For a two-dimensional consumer pro¯le, the strategy
is represented by triangular planes. See for an example Fig. 16.
Strategy encoding. The bidding strategies are encoded on the so-called chromo-
somes of an agent. A chromosome consists of a collection of \genes". Each gene is a
real value with a range between 0 and 1. In case of a one-dimensional pro¯le, these
genes together form a piece-wise linear function, which maps a consumer pro¯le
onto a value to bid. The chromosome then contains (x;y) coordinates for each of
the de¯ning points (the number of de¯ning points is a parameter in the simula-
tion), where x is the consumer pro¯le and y the bidding value. The bidding values
for the edges of the consumer pro¯le are always speci¯ed within the chromosome.
The bidding value for a given consumer pro¯le is then calculated by interpolation
between two points neighboring of the consumer pro¯le on each side.
For a two-dimensional consumer pro¯le, the strategy is represented by triangular
planes. The strategy is constructed using Delaunay triangulation of the (three-
dimensional) de¯ning points. The bidding value is then determined by interpolation
between the three vertexes of the triangle containing the given consumer pro¯le.
Initialisation. The chromosomes are initialized at the beginning of each EA run
by drawing a random number in the unit interval for each gene (from a uniform
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Fig. 16. An example of an evolved bidding strategy for a two-dimensional consumer pro¯le.
distribution).
Mutation and recombination model.. Mutation operates directly on the \chro-
mosome" of an agent. The o®spring's genes xi are created by adding a zero-mean
Gaussian variable with a standard deviation ¾i to each corresponding gene of the
parent [BÄ ack 1996; van Bragt et al. 2000]. All o®spring genes with a value larger
than unity (or smaller than zero) are set equal to unity (respectively zero). In our
simulations, we use an elegant mutation model with self-adaptive control of the
standard deviations ¾i [BÄ ack 1996, pp. 71-73][van Bragt et al. 2000]. This model
allows the evolution of both the genes and the corresponding standard deviations
at the same time. More formally, an agent consists of object variables [x0;:::;xl¡1]
and ES-parameters [¾0;:::;¾l¡1] in this model.
The mutation operator ¯rst updates an agent's ES-parameters ¾i into ¾0
i-values
in the following way:
¾0
i := ¾iexp[¿0N(0;1) + ¿Ni(0;1)]; (1)
where ¿0 and ¿ are the so-called \global" and \individual" learning rates, and
N(0;1) denotes a normally distributed random variable having expectation zero
and standard deviation one. The indices i in Ni indicates that the variable is
sampled anew for each value of i. We use commonly recommended settings for
these parameters.4 After the strategy parameters have been modi¯ed, the object
variables are mutated:
x0
i := xi + ¾0
iNi(0;1): (2)
The initial standard deviations ¾i(0) are set to a value of 0.1 (see Table V). The
4Namely, ¿0 = (
p
2l)¡1 and ¿ = (
p
2
p
l)¡1 [BÄ ack 1996, p. 72], where l is the length of the
chromosome.
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particular value chosen for ¾i(0) is not expected to be crucial, because the self-
adaptation process (consisting of the parameter updating and the chromosome se-
lection process) rapidly scales the step sizes into the proper range. To prevent
complete convergence of the population, we force all standard deviations to remain
larger than a small value "¾ = 0:025 [BÄ ack 1996, pp. 72{73] (see Table V).
Initially we focus on mutation-based models in this paper. In a later stage,
recombination can be used to ascertain whether performance is increased.
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